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In Richard Musenyesa v. Indo Zambia Bank Limited,2 the Supreme Court dealt with an 
employee whose conditions of service were altered by their employer. The entitlement to 
gratuity at the end of the employment relationship was not mentioned in the new conditions 
of employment despite being in the previous conditions that regulated his employment.  
 
Holding 
The Supreme Court provided that where acquiescence is intended to be assumed from 
conduct, credible evidence will have to be led, showing that the employee was by clear notice 
given by the employer indeed aware of the variation, understood the implications and its full 
extent, before it can be said that they acquiesced or consented by conduct. 
 
Significance  
In Pickard v. Sears,3 the court outlined the law on the principle of acquiescence as follows:  
 
Where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the 
existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief so as 
to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring 
against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.   
 
The implication from the above Pickard holding is that a party can acquiesce to a change if 
they act in such a way to induce the repudiating party that they approve the change. 
Therefore, if an employee continues to work, even if she protests, she will be, in certain 
circumstances deemed in law to have accepted the new terms and conditions of employment. 
This is especially so, where a reasonable period of since the repudiation has passed and the 
party does nothing to demonstrate their dissatisfaction.  
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The Supreme Court has over the last decade provided different positions on the principle of 
acquiescence and oscillated on the manner in which employees can accept a variation by their 
conduct. The Richard Musenyesa case is critical because it clarified and provides the manner 
in which an employee will be deemed to have accepted or rejected an adverse unilateral 
variation. 
 
In a trilogy of cases, prior to Richard Musenyesa, namely, Zambia National Commercial 
Bank v. Misheck Chanda,4 Zambian Breweries Plc v. Stanley K Musa,5 and Charles Nyambe 
& 82 Others v. Buks Haulage,6 the Supreme Court was emphatic that when an employee does 
not complain about a variation, they accepted it by acquiescence or conduct and therefore 
abandoned the rights held prior to the change. The above cases seem to suggest that if the 
employee demonstrates that they protested but continued working, they would succeed with a 
claim for unilateral breach of contract. The approach of the Supreme Court in these cases is 
in line with the English case of Wess v. Science Museum Group,7 where it was held that if 
after the unilateral variation, the employee stays on with the employer for some time, 
continues with the employment without protest, they may be deemed to have impliedly 
accepted the variation by acquiescence. 
 
Although the Supreme Court in Charles Nyambe deviated from the approach in that case, the 
Supreme Court again oscillated in its position on affirmation or rejection of a repudiatory 
breach once again in Charles Mushitu (sued in his capacity as Secretary General of Zambia 
Red Cross Society) v. Christabel M. Kaumba,8 and Engen Petroleum Zambia Limited v. 
Willis Muhanga and Jeremy Lumba.9  
 
In Charles Mushitu (sued in his capacity as Secretary General of Zambia Red Cross Society) 
v. Christabel M. Kaumba,10 an employee worked under a project that terminated and was 
then placed on unpaid leave for almost nine (9) months when she was appointed to another 
post in another town. The Supreme Court provided that placing the employee on forced, 
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5 SCZ Appeal No. 164/2014 
6 SCZ Appeal No. 202/2014.  
7 (1969) 1 All ER 471.  
8 SCZ Appeal No. 122/2015 
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unpaid leave was an adverse unilateral alteration of the contract. In relation to acquiescence, 
The Supreme Court per Malila JS provided that: 
 
Waiver of that breach or acquiescence could only legally hold if the respondent had 
done or taken any action in the nature of performing her obligations as an employee 
post that breach. 
 
The Supreme Court thus endorsed the view that acceptance by conduct can only occur if 
there is positive conduct indicating the employee consented to the repudiation. In this case 
notwithstanding the fact that the employee continued on unpaid leave without resigning and 
then accepted a new position, the court held that this was not enough to evince acceptance of 
the repudiation or waiver of the employer’s breach. This was a material move away from the 
earlier Supreme Court decisions in Misheck Chanda, Stanley K Musa and Charles Nyambe. 
The court thus provided that she could claim damages because there was no evidence that she 
elected to accept or adopt the unilateral change.  
 
The Engen Petroleum case provided that where the contract was altered, the fact that the 
party altering the contract, thus repudiating the contract does not bother to address the 
concerns of the innocent party shows that the innocent party did not acquiesce or consent to 
the revised contract. The Engen Petroleum case thereby confirmed that even where an 
innocent party does not raise a grievance, they cannot be automatically deemed to have not 
affirmed. Like in Christabel M. Kaumba, there must be much more lucid evidence to 
illustrate that the employee elected to accept the breach. This is so even though the innocent 
party in that case, as well as the Nachizi Phiri and Christabel M. Kaumba cases continued to 
work and serve under the revised conditions. 
 
What the above holding from the Supreme Court underscores is that an innocent party will 
not be deemed to have elected to have affirmed a repudiation if they had knowledge of the 
facts as well as their right to choose between accepting and rejecting the repudiation. Only 
where this is proven, the innocent party will be deemed to have affirmed the contract by their 
conduct i.e. acquiescence. 
          
The Richard Musenyesa Supreme Court judgment seems to have settled the position as it 





consent, if nothing more is done, as held in Stanley K Musa and Charles Nyambe even under 
Zambian employment law. The Richard Musenyesa case provides that where clear notice is 
given of the repudiation and the innocent party is aware and understands the full extent, only 
then can affirmation of the repudiation or acquiescence be deemed to have occurred. The 
Nachizi Phiri, Christabel M. Kaumba and Engen Petroleum trilogy of cases are clear that the 
conduct of an employee in such circumstances must be such that it induces a reasonable 
person to believe that the other party intends to remain bound following a variation to the 
contract. 
 
The position in these cases seems to accord with the principles from the common law, which 
provides that mere inactivity after breach by another party does not amount to affirmation. In 
Yukong Line Limited of Korea v. Rendberg Investment Corporation of Liberia,11 the court 
provided that: 
 
…the law does not require an injured party to snatch at a repudiation and he does not 
automatically lose his right to treat the contract as discharged merely by calling on the 
other to reconsider his position and recognise his obligation. 
 
What the above indicates is that where an innocent party to a contract raises a grievance or 
calls on the party repudiating the contract to change their position, this indicates that they 
have not affirmed the contract. As such the recent Supreme Court decision in Richard 
Musenyesa which endorsed the Nachizi Phiri, Christabel M. Kaumba and Engen Petroleum 
decisions has brought Zambian law somewhat in line with common law principles. 
 
The Supreme Court in its holding was in effect stating that the employee’s silence amounted 
to withholding of consent with the effect that the employee accepted the repudiation. This is 
justified, even under contract law, where the position is that whilst silence on its own may, in 
appropriate cases, signify acquiescence to the variation, it can never signify an acceptance of 
repudiation. Nourse LJ sums up this view when he posits that: 
A choice, however resolute, which gains no expression outside the bosom of the 
chooser cannot be clear and unequivocal in the sense that the law requires. Silence 
                                                             





and inaction, being in the general cases equally consistent with an affirmation of the 
contract, cannot constitute acceptance of a repudiation.12  
 
For all these reasons, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s holding in Richard Musenyesa on 
the issue of whether the employee had affirmed the repudiation and consented to the 
alteration of his contract, is in line with the law of contract. The law as it stands in Zambia on 
a protesting employee who continues to work, is as provided in the Engen Petroleum and 
Richard Musenyesa cases, is that even if they continue to work after protesting, the employee 
will not be deemed to have acquiesced. Richard Musenyesa provides that if an employee can 
properly demonstrate the they protested the unilateral changes to their employment terms and 
conditions and continued to work, they will not be deemed to have acquiesced to the terms 
and can challenge the change and claim redundancy or early retirement for unilateral 
variation. It is submitted that this is not in line with the law on acquiescence as illustrated 
above.  
 
As mentioned above, employment contracts are like any other contract, but with statutory 
interventions. Apart from statutory interventions, developments in jurisprudence also alter 
the rules that apply in employment law. The Supreme Court has thus made it more difficult 
for employers to imply consent to unilateral variations of the contract. The justification as 
provided in the Attorney General v. Nachizi Phiri and 10 Others,13 and Engen Petroleum 
cases is to protect employees who should have their legitimate expectation to what they 
agreed to, safeguarded.  
 
The justification for the deviation from established contractual principles in this area of 
employment is important because it shows the inclination to protect employees who have 
weak bargaining power in the employment relationship. If the ordinary principles of contract 
were to apply, most employees in Zambia would arguably be at the whim of their employers 
who would make changes to their detriment, without any protection for the employee. 
 
Acceptance by conduct according to the Supreme Court in Richard Musenyesa is only the 
case where the innocent party does nothing to illustrate their rejection of the variation. In 
such a situation, acquiescence cannot be said to occur as the innocent party cannot be said to 
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have induced the repudiating party to believe that they have accepted the different state of 
affairs created by the repudiation. In Khatri v. Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-
Boerenleenbank BA, an employee refused to consent to a variation by not signing the 
variation letter and continued to work. The court held that the fact that he continued to work 
did not automatically mean he accepted the unilateral and adverse changes.  
 
It would have been helpful for the recent Richard Musenyesa case to address the legal 
principles pronounced upon in Misheck Chanda, Stanley K Musa and Charles Nyambe which 
provided that an employee needs to demonstrate that they protested to justify an assent to a 
unilateral variation. It is clear that these cases, especially in the employment law context are 
not completely accurate. However even without mentioning those cases, it is clear Richard 
Musenyesa is now the legal position in this area of law. In Davies Jokie Kasote v. The 
People14 the Supreme Court held: 
 
A lower court is not entitled to say simply because the Supreme Court in a judgment 
has not mentioned an earlier decision of the same Court that the earlier decision was 
overlooked and that the later decision was therefore given per incuriam.  
 
Therefore, it follows that on the strength of the decision in Kasote, a later Supreme Court 
judgment, where the facts and circumstances are similar to a previous judgment on the 
matter, the later judgment should prevail over the earlier decision, even though in the later 
case the court did not refer to the previous decision. Therefore, for now, the Richard 
Musenyesa is the law of Zambia on acquiescence of unilateral alterations of the contract that 
are disadvantageous and have not been consented to. 
 
The Supreme Court’s approach in Richard Musenyesa case is both justifiable and helpful in 
protecting employees. The Supreme Court endorsed the principle that even where an innocent 
party accepts performance of the repudiating party after becoming aware of the breach and 
does not expressly protest, this is not automatically acquiescence. The law of contract goes 
beyond. Although common law dictates that an innocent party affirms a contract after an 
innocent party fails to terminate after a reasonable time, the law of contract also provides that 
                                                             





where an innocent party’s conduct does not show approval, they can successfully claim that 
they did not acquiesce.  
 
This is especially so in the employment context. In Rigby v. Ferodo Limited,15 the court was 
resolute that an employee can only claim damages for a unilateral variation if they make it 
clear that they are not prepared to accept the unilateral variation and have done nothing 
subsequently to evince any consent to the unilateral change imposed. The court per Lord 
Oliver held:  
 
…I know of no principle of law that any breach which the innocent party is entitled to 
treat as repudiatory of the other party’s obligations brings the contract to an end 
automatically.  
 
What the above statements infer is that when a party breaches a contract, the contract does 
not automatically terminate. The reasoning in the Rigby case above has been confirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited v. Boyd Chomba Mutambo and 
Others16 where the Supreme Court was of the view that if there is evidence that employees 
did not accept a unilateral variation, they will not be bound a contract that has been 
unilaterally altered to their detriment. The Nitrogen Chemicals case accords with the recent 
approach taken in Richard Musenyesa that there must be evidence that an employee being 
fully aware of the variation, understood the implications and its full extent and choose to 
accept the situation. 
 
Thus, whereas it would seem that the approach in the recent Richard Museyensa case does 
not accord with contractual law principles in relation to acceptance by conduct, the analysis 
above illustrates that this is not necessarily the case. The law of contract differentiates 
between acceptance by silence and by conduct. Where an innocent party and their subsequent 
conduct indicates that they did not accept the repudiation, the court, especially in 
employment cases, will protect the party and uphold the contract. Above all, it is clear that 
the Supreme Court is now more inclined to protect the sanctity of contract, especially in 
employment cases where employees are in a weaker position to express their views on 
changes that affect the employment relationship. 
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Lastly, it is also worth considering the holding in the case of Zambia Daily Mail Limited v. 
Grevesious Muyenga and Others.17 In that case, the Board of Directors of the employer 
amended the retirement benefits for management employees by reducing the entitlement from 
six months basic pay, to three months basic pay for each year worked. The employees 
continued working for a short period until they retired. The Supreme Court provided that: 
 
…where the variation of the conditions of service has of no immediate practical 
effect, as in the present case, there can be no implied consent, for mere failure to 
object. 
 
According to the court in Grevesious Muyenga where the variation relates to a matter which 
has immediate practical application (e.g. the rate of pay) and the employee continues to work 
without objection after effect has been given to the variation then obviously they may well be 
taken to have impliedly consented, but if it does not have immediate practical application 
such as a retirement or terminal benefit and the employee does not protest or resign, more 
evidence is required to indicate they consented. 
 
The position in Grevesious Muyenga is attractive because it provides another benchmark for 
measuring acquiescence and acceptance of a unilateral, adverse variation by conduct. Where 
the variation will take effect immediately, such as forced unpaid leave like in Christabel M. 
Kaumba, implicit agreement can only be inferred if the conduct of the employee indicates 
that they do not object to the change. However where the practical application of the 
unilateral variation is not immediate, more credible evidence as provided in Richard 
Musenyesa is required. It is submitted that this approach is necessary to protect the legitimate 
expectations and welfare of employees under the contract of employment they entered into.  
 
In essence, the practical application test recognises the stronger bargaining power of 
employers and protects employees from receiving less benefits under the contract due to a 
variation that they did not consent, or intend to be bound to. For these reasons, the extensive 
test for acquiescence developed from Nachizi Phiri, Christabel M. Kaumba, Engen 
Petroleum and Richard Musenyesa is attractive in mitigating against unilateral variations that 
                                                             





an employee could or would never have agreed to. The previous tests of not protesting 
indicating consent by conduct would have put Zambian employees at the whim of their 
employer.  
 
Now, by virtue of Richard Musenyesa, employees do not have to resign and risk losing their 
livelihoods or be victimised for protesting, but must produce evidence that they did not 
consent. Therefore even if they continue in employment or don’t protest, if there is evidence 
they did not agree or would not have agreed to a change to their detriment, the courts will 
hold that their previous, unaltered contract will govern their relationship with the employer 
rather than the adversely, unilaterally altered contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
